FTEC 4004 TUTORIAL 8 RFID (IN)SECURITY

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ABOUT THIS TUTORIAL


- We have learnt various smart card techniques in the lecture
- In this tutorial let's do something fun: RFID hacking
 - What kind of RFID tags are vulnerable?
 - What is required (hardware/software) to crack a card?
 - How to protect users/yourself.
- Disclaimer: this tutorial is for educational purpose only, do not attempt to break the law!


BASIC CONCEPTS

- RFID Radio-frequency identification
- NFC Near-field communication
 - HF (13.56MHz)
 - There are other cards/protocols working on LF (125 134 kHz)
- Contactless card & contact card
- Passive & Active

WE USE IT EVERYDAY

- Contactless: Mifare Classic/Plus
- Contact chip: MULTOS
- Does your CULINK have a contact chip?
- How many bytes for printed UID?
- Final question: is CULINK secure?





RFID CARDS



RFID STANDARDS

- ISO14443A: Mifare (NXP)
- ISO14443B: CryptoRF (Motorola/Atmel)
- ISO14443C: Felica (Sony)
- ISO14443D: (OTI)
- ISO14443E: (Cubic)
- ISO14443F: Legic (KABA)
- ISO15693: Tag-IT (Texas Instruments)

Short range	Mid range	Long range
<= 15 centimeter	<= 5meter	Up to 500 meter
ISO 14443 A+B	ISO 15693	ISO 18000-xx
13.56 MHz,	13.56 MHz,	860-956 MHz (UHF)
125-134.2kHz	125-135kHz	2.4 GHz (Microwave)
		5.8 GHz (Microwave)
E-field, magnetic field	EM-field	EM-field

Different types of RFID transponders

HACKER'S ACTIONS

- Read Unencrypted vs encrypted
- Clone Read and write to new card
- Sniff Eavesdropping, relay attack
- Emulate Emulate card with devices

TOOLS – PHONE NFC SUPPORTED PHONE = NFC READER



52708B4CC1880400C185149151201011 0102030405000000090A0B0C0D0E8079 09111120011201CB422C9F1707660880 FFFFAABBCCDD63C78900FF0011BB3838

ector: 1

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Sector: 0

Dump Editor

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Sector: 2

20FF110C07DC0C3FFF0001F40000009 264D120307DD0D0A0000000000001234 3d2048656c6c6f20576f726c64203d00 00000000000072D78800

ector: 3

AABBCCDDEEFF00112233445566778899 FD8293858BBB0000000000000000000A0A 000009999921230000000000000000FF FFAAFFAAFFAAF70F78800

Sector: 4

Caption: (Update Colors) UID & Manufinfo | ValueBlock | KeyA | KeyB | ACs



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UID[4] cc1f5f89

RF technology Type A (ISO/IEC 14443 Type A)

Tag type Mifare Classic 1K

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> Target technology classes (Android) android.nfc.tech.MifareClassic, android.nfc.tech.NfcA, android.nfc.tech.Ndef

> > Back

MIFARE Classic Tool

• NFC Taginfo

TOOLS - CARD READERS


- E.g. ACR122u
 - Advanced Card Systems Ltd (ACS), a Hong Kong company
 - Octopus reader
 - NXP PN532 chip, HF only
 - Cheap: 150 HKD
- Softwares
 - libnfc
 - RFIDiot
 - MFOC
 - miLazyCracker



POWERFUL TOOL


• Proxmark3

- HF and LF
- Snoop communications
- Emulate cards
- Expensive: 1k+ HKD
- Open-soruce hardware
- Cheap now:
 - China clones, 250HKD



CASE STUDY – MIFARE CLASSIC

- Most widely used smart card
- Format
 - 16 sectors, each 4 blocks of 16 bytes
 - Data are encrypted
 - Two Key for access control
 - Key length: 48 bits (6 bytes)
 - UID (block 0) is readonly and public
 - Used as sole access control or identity in many cases
 - Some times printed on cards



CASE STUDY – MIFARE CLASSIC


• Data communication

Step	Sender	Hex	Abstract
01	Reader	26	req type A
02	Tag	04 00	answer req
03	Reader	93 20	select
04	Tag	c2 a8 2d f4 b3	uid, bcc
05	Reader	93 70 c2 a8 2d f4 b3 ba a3	select(uid)
06	Tag	08 b6 dd	MIFARE 1K
07	Reader	60 30 76 4a	auth(block 30)
08	Tag	42 97 c0 a4	n _T
09	Reader	7d db 9b 83 67 eb 5d 83	$n_R \oplus ks1$, $a_R \oplus ks_2$
10	Tag	8b d4 10 08	$a_T \oplus ks_3$

CASE STUDY – MIFARE CLASSIC

Hacker's favorite

- (2008) Hardware reverse engineering
 - Custom encryption: Crypto-1
 - Sniff and decrypt attack
- (2009) Nested Attack MFOC tool
 - Know one key, crack all (10 sec)
- (2009) Dark-Side Attack MFCUK tool
 - Card-only attack (10 min)
- (2015) HardNested Attack
 - Card-only attack (30 min)
- A lot more ...




MIFARE CLASSIC – ATTACK SCENARIOS


 Try default keys: 	AULULA	a0a1a2a3a4a5
	D3f7d3f7d3f7	aabbccddeeff
	b0b1b2b3b4b5	000000000000
	4d3a99c351dd	1a982c7e459a

- Some keys are known -> Nested attack (MFOC) to recover the rest
- If no default key found, try Dard-Side Attack (MFCUK)
- If all not work -> sniff and decrypt

MIFARE CLASSIC – ATTACK SCENARIOS



OVERALL ATTACK FLOW



MIFARE CLASSIC – ATTACK SCENARIOS

- After all data is decrypted and read
 - Clone to a blank card or emulate with proxmark3
 - Some situation require the change of UID
 - Chinese Magic Card: UID changeable, backdoor commands (¥1.00)
 - Supported by libnfc, proxmark3, etc



SECURITY ADVICE

- NXP (manufacturer of MIFARE cards) recommends upgrade existing MIFARE Classic systems and donnot use it in any security relevant application.
- Use RFID shield (really?)
- Don't lend your card to untrusted.
- Don't leak photo of your card.



DEMO TIME

REFERENCES

- Proxmark3: <u>https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3</u>
- Paper of Dark-Side attack: <u>https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/196096/1/196096.pdf</u>
- Paper of HardNested attack: <u>https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2810103.2813641</u>
- A 2018 practical gudie to hacking NFC/RFID: <u>https://smartlockpicking.com/slides/Confidence_A_2018_Practical_Guide_To</u> <u>Hacking_RFID_NFC.pdf</u>